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Summary
For the past 30 years, the corporate income tax rates in the OECD countries have de-
creased from 45 percent in 1982 to below 27 percent in 2012. At the same time, the
corporate income tax revenue as share of GDP has increased. Tax competition is seen
as the main source of this development.
Firms respond behaviourally to the tax rate and the tax systems deductions and
allowances in order to maximise their after-tax returns. The larger the behavioural
effect is, the greater the revenue costs and dead weight loss for society becomes. Firms
decide in which country to locate based on comparing their expected after-tax profits
between countries. Further, a multinational firm can shift their profits to be taxed
in countries with low taxes. A firm, or an entrepreneur, will also choose legal form
based on tax incentives. Investments and the financial structure of the firm are also
influenced, determining how much to invest and the composition of debt and equity.
I use panel data of 19 OECD countries in the period of 1982 to 2012 to estimate
the long run effects of the domestic and neighbouring tax rates on the corporate tax
base. The regression controls for various macro data variables such as income per
capita, GDP, growth, cost of labor and EU-membership as well as country specific,
time invariant and country trend effects.
The results of this analysis is that the tax base is elastic with regards to changes
in the domestic tax rate, specifically, the elasticity of -1.17 in the tax base with a one
percent change in domestic tax rate. The effects of neighbouring countries changes in
tax rates are inelastic and of low significance. A comparison of my results to the closely
related literature of similar methodology shows a higher elasticity of the tax base and
less effect of the neighbouring tax rates then previous findings. Extensions show that
replacing the data for Norway with oil-revenue corrected data increases the estimated
elasticity of the domestic tax rate and lowers the effect of the foreign tax rate.
The dynamic model estimations show that in the short run the tax base is inelastic,
where half the effect of a change in the domestic tax rate occurs in the immediate year.
The resulting long run semi-elasticity of -2.9 % is close to the aggregate effect estimated
in a meta-analysis by De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) of -3.1 % of a one percentage point
change in the tax rate.
iii
iv
Contents
1 Background and motivation 1
2 Model of the corporate tax base 4
2.1 Effective, marginal and statutory tax rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Localization decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Profit shifting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 Choice of legal form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5 Investments and financial structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6 Fundamental tax competition model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.7 Country size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.8 Neighbouring countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9 Other factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Empirical analysis 16
3.1 Empirical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Regression specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Sample data selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Neighbouring tax rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5 Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6 Estimation technique, instrumentation and standard errors . . . . . . . . 21
3.7 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4 Estimation 25
4.1 Comparing results to Riedl and Rocha-Akis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Full dataset regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 Conclusion 37
References 39
6 Appendix 43
6.1 Data variables and sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2 Tables comparing my own and Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012)’s data . . . 45
6.3 Visual and descriptive data of own dataset 1982–2012 . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.4 First stage regression for full sample 1982 - 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
v
List of Figures
1 Statutory tax rates in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and OECD . . . . . . . 1
2 Corporate tax revenue as % of GDP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3 Tax competition Nash equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 Number of corporations in Norway: 2003 - 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Scatterplot, tax base and domestic tax rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6 FDI number of top 1 and top 3 position by receiving countries . . . . . . 34
7 Percentage difference between mine and RR panel observations on bit
and τit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8 Corporate income tax base, per capita 1982- 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9 Statutory, and average corporate income tax rate 1982- 2012 . . . . . . . 51
List of Tables
1 Share of total number of foreign owned corporations . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Regression comparison mine and Riedl and Rocha-Akis’ (2011) data . . 27
3 First stage of regressions in Table 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Baseline estimates 1982 - 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5 Robustness analysis of preferred regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6 Data variables, measures and sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7 Data variables, measures and sources (Norway corrected for petroleum
sector) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8 Descriptive statistics. Differences between own and compared dataset. . 45
9 Correlation table. Differences between own and compared dataset. . . . 46
10 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11 Correlation table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12 First stage regression comparing instruments (5) and (9) in Table 4. . . . 52
vi
1 Background and motivation
The government collects tax revenue in order to provide public goods and welfare
services or correct externalities. To raise revenue the government can use a repertoire
of taxes and fees on labor, goods, capital and corporations. The corporate income tax
(CIT) is one of these tax instruments, and the focus of this thesis. The challenge of
taxation is to find the least distortive ways of raising the needed tax-revenue. For
the past 30 years, the corporate income tax has been under international downward
pressure. The development is characterized by countries taxing at a lower income
tax rate, see Figure 1, but, at the same time, broadening the base of taxable capital
(Auerbach et al., 2008; Haufler, 2001). The Norwegian Ministry of Finance pointed to
the international development and increased tax competition when they appointed a
committee to investigate the necessity of a reform of the Norwegian corporate income
tax (MOF, 2014).
Figure 1: Statutory tax rates in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and OECD
Years: 1981 – 2012. Source: OECD (2015).
As shown in Figure 2, the declining statutory tax rates have not resulted in a de-
crease in the corporate income tax’s share of gross domestic products. There are ar-
guments against taxing capital and the classical result of a small open economy is not
to tax it at all (Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 1995). In a globalised economy, capital is
mobile and taxation will, therefore, create distortions. However, while capital is mo-
bile, the long term nature of real capital investments1 is that firms in the short and
1Real capital investments include factories, equipment and inventories.
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Figure 2: Corporate tax revenue as % of GDP.
Sources: OECD, SSB and Ministry of Finance (MOF). Norway with and without
correcting for petroleum sector and averages.
medium run are not perfectly mobile. Some countries, like Norway, have access to rich
natural resources, such as oil, which provides ample room for a rent-specific corporate
taxation. Given the international downward pressure through tax competition and the
states eagerness to respond the empirical question arises, how harmful is it to tax mo-
bile capital? More specifically the question this thesis seeks to answer is; How sensitive
is the corporate tax base to changes in the corporate tax rate?
It is well known that the excess burden of taxation increases exponentially with the
amount of taxation, and the loss is higher the more elastic the response to taxation is
(Stiglitz, 2000). Empirical estimates of the elasticity of the corporate tax base to changes
in corporate tax rates provide important information for assessing both revenue and
welfare implications of corporate tax policies (Dwenger and Steiner, 2008).
There has been substantial amount of empirical research on the subject of corporate
tax elasticity. A meta-analysis done by De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) cover 31 of these
studies. They find that the semi-elasticity, namely the percentage change in the tax base
from a 1% point change in the tax rate, has to an aggregate effect of -3.1% on the tax
base2. The Swedish Committee of Corporate Taxation (SOU, 2014) uses the estimates
2This is the total effect ignoring spillover effects and assuming a unilateral equal change in the stat-
utory, average- and marginal effective tax rates of one percentage point.
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of De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) to find that a one percentage increase of the CIT will
have an effect of decreasing the Swedish’ tax base by -1.85%. The committee appointed
by the Ministry of Finance in Norway (MOF, 2014) uses the same method and finds a
similar estimate of -1.76% for the Norwegian tax base.
The empirical methodology in this paper will be based on the method of Riedl
and Rocha-Akis (2012). They explored the tax base elasticity in 17 OECD countries
in the period of 1982 to 2005. The authors found that a country’s aggregate repor-
ted corporate profits are negatively and significantly affected by CIT rate reduction in
neighboring countries. Furthermore, they found that a unilateral decrease in a coun-
try’s domestic statutory tax rate decreases the aggregate corporate income tax revenue.
They estimated that the corporate tax base is inelastic in the long run, as a one percent-
age increase in the efficient average tax rate leads to a -0.86% decrease in the tax base.
In the terms of semi-elasticity this amounts to a -1.24% decrease in tax base. As the
corporate income tax is highly current topic, of constant development, with the avail-
ability of newer and potentially higher quality data it is interesting to re-examine this
issue in a new and broader analysis.
In the next section I will examine what the corporate tax base is and what affects it.
In section 3, i will present the empirical methodology and the data used. In section 4 I
will discuss the findings and robustness of the results before the conclusion.
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2 Model of the corporate tax base
The government’s corporate income tax revenue is given by a tax rate τ multiplied
with the corporate tax base b. The tax base can be defined as the sum of taxable profits
of all the number of firms in the economy. There are multiple factors deciding the size
of the corporate tax base, including the corporate income tax rate, tax laws including
depreciation rates in addition to business cycles, as well as individual and firm beha-
viour.
The pre-tax profits as observed from the government, denoted p˜i , of a single firm
i is given by equation (1). This consists of sales income that is given by the product
price p multiplied by the production function Fi(Li, Ki, Zi). The production function
is dependent upon the input factors labor (Li), capital (Ki) and other factors (Zi) as
well as their respective costs. If I assume the cost of labor to be the hourly wage wi and
payroll tax per hour t multiplied with hours of input Li. The cost of holding a unit of
capital is given by the interest rate i on the value of a unit of capital plus the value of its
depreciation, denoted δ where 0 < δ < 1. I can gather the cost of all other input factors
in si where θ could be some other associated cost, for instance an environmental tax.
p˜ii = piFi(Li, Ki, Zi)− (1 + t)wiLi − (i + δ)qiKi − (1−θ)siZi (1)
I assume that the firm is a single price taker in commodity and factor markets.
The firm maximizes its net post tax profits piposttax = pi − τp˜i where p˜i is the firms
taxable profits3. I see that taxes t,θ, input factor costs wi, qi and depreciation allowance
from the government α affect the tax base directly. The governments tax total base
will be the sum of the taxable profits p˜i of all firms in the economy. This gives the
following expression for the sum of total taxable corporate profits, or in other words
the governments corporate tax base denoted b:
b =
N
∑
i=1
p˜ii =
N
∑
i=1
(piFi(Li, Ki, Zi)− (1 + t)wiLi − (i +α)qiKi − (1 +θ)siZi) (2)
In addition to prices and taxes other factors like labor productivity, access to cap-
ital, natural resources, state and institutional factors such as political stability and in-
frastructure can be assumed to be important. In the globalized economy the investor
and firm will compare all these factors both within and between countries in the in-
vestment decision.
3The reason for not simply stating that the firm’s profit is (1 − τ)pi is that the deductions and ad-
aptions as allowed in the tax system might not be entirely equal to the firm’s true valuations of these.
Meaning the firm’s true profits might be different then the one "observed" and taxed by the government
allowing the firm to optimize over this discrepancy.
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Following in this section I will elaborate on the different measures of the corporate
tax rate. Further I will cover the most important dimensions of how firm behaviour
are affected by corporate taxes, specifically how the firms location of investments, legal
form, financial structure and profit shifting affect the corporate tax base.
2.1 Effective, marginal and statutory tax rates
The statutory tax rate is the most simple measure of a country’s tax rate. It can con-
sist of multiple rates for different layers of government with local, state and federal
taxes with the possibility of deductions between these. It can also be proportional or
progressive where firms below a certain size belongs to a lower tax bracket.
An international investor or firm will compare statutory tax rates but also other tax-
or judicial rules, regulations and allowances that impact the post-tax profits of the firm.
The impact of taxes on the investment decision can be measured through the impact on
the cost of capital using the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The EMTR as described
by Devereux and Griffith (1998) describes the proportionate difference between the
pre-tax and post-tax required rates of return of a marginal investment. The higher the
EMTR the greater the required pre-tax return is and subsequently a lower incentive to
invest. For a firm comparing multiple profitable investment projects it will compare
the effective average tax rate (EATR). The EATR is a weighted average between the
EMTR and the statutory tax rate. For the marginal investment the EATR is equal to
the EMTR and as the economic rents (pure profits) increase the EATR approaches the
statutory tax rate measure.
As firms are not homogeneous and countries tax systems can be complex with sets
of deductions depending on industries the average effective tax rate will vary between
firms within a country. The EATR measure for a country is estimated with certain
assumptions about the representative investment such as the composition of short-
and long lived capital as well as the representative firm’s financial structure (Devereux
et al., 2009).
Devereux and Griffith (1998) presents evidence that the three measures of corpor-
ate tax rate are all useful determinants of where a firm invests (extensive margin),
how much it invests (intensive margin) and lastly where it shifts profits. The authors
found that US firms moving to Europe would determine where to locate themselves
by comparing the EATR between the countries. After choosing country the amount of
investments was best described by the EMTR measure. While lastly the location where
the firm wishes to shift and extracts it’s profits was most influenced by the statutory
tax rate measure.
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2.2 Localization decision
In the neoclassical view of the firm with mobile capital, the investor will chose coun-
tries from around the globe where the returns to capital are highest, which in turn will
equalize the return to capital in all countries (Haufler, 2001). De Mooij and Ederveen
(2008) assume that there might be multinationals with the ability to receive firm-specific
rents that are mobile across countries. In the presence of rents, the average effective tax
rate will be the relevant measure for the firm to evaluate localization decision in order
to maximise after their tax profits.
However, more factors vary than just the marginal and average tax rates. Diverging
from the neoclassical view a managerial firm will take internal considerations such as
the firms interests and objectives (Stiglitz, 2000). The firm will also consider the ex-
ternal factors influencing the labor market, such as labor regulations, social policies
and other factors contributing to the cost of labor. The firm will also consider the goods
and services market with standards, closeness to market, competition regulation, in-
frastructure and foreign trade policies. Lastly the firm will consider capital market
conditions4.
Devereux and Griffith (1998) find that, in addition to the effective average tax rate,
agglomeration effects are important in the firms localization decision. Agglomeration
effects is when a large installed capital base has positive externalities onto new in-
vestors, such effects could lower the sensitivity of changes in the tax rate (Keen and
Konrad, 2012). De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) find in their meta study a substantial
effect of the effective average tax rate on localization choice.
2.3 Profit shifting
In the global economy, a multinational firm operating in several countries can be as-
sumed to optimize its profits over all companies as a whole, taking into account the
various tax rates, deductions and allowances. The arm’s length principle is the ruling
principle of dividing the tax base between parties of common interests. The principle
states that transactions between related parties shall be done at the same terms, here-
under prices, as the same transaction between unrelated parties (Auerbach et al., 2008).
However this principle is often challenged when confronted with nontraditional trans-
actions such as intellectual property rights (Fuest et al., 2013).
If I assume a company in country a supplies a good or service to the company
in country b. The service has a market value of 1. The firms can however deviate
from the arm’s length principle and set a different price to shift profits to be taxed
under a different country. Using the model for the tax base with equation (2) I can
4Hereunder monetary policies, fiscal policy with corporate income tax, dividends tax, interest taxes
and subsidies
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interpret the earlier Zi as an input factor or service bought from a mother company.
The subsidiary firm can for instance pay royalties for using intellectual property rights
such as the brand name of a mother company. A deviation from the market price s (set
to unity s = 1) will shift profits either to or from the company. Profit shifting comes
at an undeductable concealment cost φ(s) which is assumed to have the following
properties: φ(1) = 0,φ′(1) = 0 andφ′′(1) > 0.
I will for simplicity assume that all other taxes and variables are equal between the
countries a and b. This entails providing full deductability of capital costs and a depre-
ciation at the true rate such that the sum of the real corporate profits are equal to the
tax base5. The multinational firm maximizes its total profits taking both subsidiaries
into consideration and optimizing with regards to the transfer price s.
piMNC = (1− τa)pia + (1− τb)pib −φ(s) (3)
Inserting for a simplified expression for the firms profit where prices are equated and
the subsidiary firm in country a buys a service at value 1 and price s from the firm in
country b.
piMNC = (1− τa)(pFa(Ka)− (i +α)qKa − s + 1)
+(1− τb)(pFb(Kb)− (i +α)qKb + s− 1)−φ(s)
(4)
This gives a first order condition for the optimal transfer price s between the two
companies:
∂piMNC
∂s
= (τa − τb)−φ′(s) = 0 (5)
(τa − τb) = φ′(s) (6)
The equilibrium behaviour of the multinational firm is to shift profits to the point
where the marginal cost of shifting one more unit of profit equals the marginal be-
nefit of shifting tax-country. If τa > τb it can be optimal for the multinational company
do exert profit shifting from country a to country b. If tax rates are equal the good will
be priced at its true value in both markets.
2.4 Choice of legal form
For small businesses or single entrepreneurs the relationship between the corporate
income tax and the personal income tax (PIT) is a potential source of distortions. An
active shareholder can choose between receiving labor income or dividends of the cor-
5The instance where the company’s profits and the governments tax base are the same, and equal to
pi(1− τ).
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porate profits. Differences between PIT and CIT can also create arbitrage opportunities
for personal consumption to be covered by the firm or firm profits to be provided as
loans to the shareholder. Gordon and Slemrod (1998) looks at US data in a period
in the 1980’s with personal income tax cuts. The authors write that income shifting
plays havoc with the usual interpretation of many kinds of data as it blurs the division
between return to capital and the return to labor.
De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) find that when corporate income taxes are falling,
the change in legal form from self-employed to incorporation has lead to an increase in
the tax base and the stabilization of corporate tax revenues. The change from self em-
ployment to corporate form will in most countries move the income from the personal
to the corporate income tax bracket. The larger the difference between the corporate
and personal income tax rates will incentivize a change of legal form leading to distor-
tions. The authors however finds that other non-tax benefits such as limited liabilities
are more important in the decision of legal form. De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) takes
the average of two studies and estimates that a one percent increase in corporate taxes
will lead to a 0.7% decrease in the corporate tax base through change in legal form.
Norway, under the dual income tax system from 1992 taxed labor income progress-
ively and capital income proportionally (MOF, 2014). The underlying assumption for
the difference in tax rates was that capital was mobile and labor immobile, therefore
taxing labor income higher would be less harmful. The dual system lead to neces-
sary split income rules for small businesses to hinder income shifting. The split model
applied to sole proprietors and corporations with more than two-thirds of the shares
held by active owners. Under the split model the return to labor of active owners were
counted as labor income irrespective of it being paid as dividends, wages or retained
profits. An entrepreneur who wanted to shift income from the personal bracket to
the lower bracket belonging to the corporate form could do so by making changes to
the ownership structure of the firm. The self-employed or closely held corporation
would need to become "widely held" where at least one third was owned by a pass-
ive shareholder. Alstadsæter (2007) finds that the dual income tax system can lead
to over-investment in low risk real capital as a device to shift income from personal
to corporate income taxation. Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2010) confirm empirically
that economically successful small firms have a substantial tax minimizing incentive
to avoid the split model, by satisfying the one third passive shareholder requirement
and becoming a widely held corporation. The main purpose of the 2006 tax reform was
to remove this distortion created in the split model by evening out the highest taxes on
labor and firm ownership through lowering of the marginal labor tax and introducing
a dividends tax for individuals (Børresen et al., 2014).
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2.5 Investments and financial structure
The tax system can create distortions on the financial structure of the firm by a po-
tentially strong behavioural response on the composition of debt and equity (Mirrlees
et al., 2011). A firms investment can either be financed by debt, issued equity or re-
tained earnings. Sandmo (1974) shows that if depreciation allowance is unequal to the
true rate of depreciation the pre-tax factor prices are distorted and therefore leads to
under or over-investment in capital/labor. If rates of depreciation allowance and in-
terest deductability are generous they may actually encourage investments relative to
a no-tax situation (Stiglitz, 2000).
Projects financed by debt are in most tax systems provided with pre-tax deduction
of interest payment while there are no deductions for the opportunity cost of equity.
A tax systems’ non-neutral treatment of finance sources influence the choice of capital
in that it stimulates an equity or usually debt-bias. Debt bias is the situation where
the firm has a financial structure with a greater share of debt because of its adjustment
to a distortion created by the tax system where debt is biased over equity. Under the
assumption that debt is initially a cheaper form of finance then equity for the firm the
firm will initially use some share of debt financing. However, as the debt-equity ratio
increases, the cost of debt also increases. The lender is increasingly exposed to the risk
of bankruptcy and assumeingly increasing costs as a result of asymmetric information,
uncertainty and other agency costs. Under the assumption that the firm will always
finance a share of an investment with equity a debt bias will increase the cost of cap-
ital and debt-equity ratio above the socially optimal. Deductions of interest payments
leading to a debt-bias opens the economy up for thin capitalization and inefficiencies
(MOF, 2014). This is used as one of the main arguments for the coming Swedish tax re-
form (SOU, 2014). Sørensen (2014) has estimated that the current tax system of Norway
distorts the firms choice of equity-debt ratio where the debt-asset ratio is 4-5 percent
points above the socially optimal. Several countries have introduced thin capitaliza-
tion rules to limit large scale conversions of equity to debt in order to avoid taxation
(SOU, 2014).
2.6 Fundamental tax competition model
A fundamental result in the literature is that tax competition with mobile capital leads
to an inefficiently low capital tax rate and therefore, an under provision of public
goods, as shown by the benchmark model for tax competition presented by Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986). This section follows the presentation of Haufler (2001) where
returns to capital is taxed in the country it occurs, also known as source taxation. Con-
sidering a static model of n identical countries, where n ∈ [1, . . . ,∞], each individual
in every country has an identical supply of one unit of labor and owns k units of capital
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stock. With immobile labor and perfectly mobile capital the rate of return R is equal in
all jurisdictions. Denoting the amount of capital employed in each jurisdiction by ki,
capital market clearing implies:
N
∑
i=1
ki =
N
∑
i=1
k¯ = K¯ (7)
The countries produce a single and homogeneous output good. The production
function is identical across countries and given by f (ki) with the fixed labor input sup-
pressed and assumed perfectly competitive output and factor markets. The production
function is twice differentiable with decreasing returns to scale:
f ′(ki) > 0, f ′′(ki) < 0
Investors compare the net-of-tax returns of capital, f ′(ki)− ti where ti is the coun-
try levied source tax rate. From the perspective of a typical country i the arbitrage
condition is:
f ′(ki)− ti = R(ti) ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n]
The interest rate R is equalized worldwide and a function of ti when the amount
of countries n is finite. With implicit differentiation of country i′s tax rate on itself,
and the other country, I can find the effects of a marginal increase from country i′s tax
rate. The differentiation shows that an increase in the capital taxation, in any country,
reduces the amount of capital employed there. The capital flows to all other countries
until the new equilibrium is achieved.
f ′′(ki)
∂k
∂t
− 1 = ∂R
∂t
(8)
∂ki
∂ti
=
(1 + ∂R∂ti )
f ′′(ki)
(9)
f ′(k j)− t j = R (10)
∂k j
∂ti
=
∂R
∂ti
f ′′(k j)
∀i, j, i 6= j (11)
With the perspective of country i and denoting all other countries as j differentiation
of the market clearing condition gives us:
ki + (n− 1)k j = K¯ (12)
∂ki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂k j
∂ti
= 0 (13)
10
Inserted the differentiated arbitrage condition (7), (9) and (11) I get that the effect of a
change in country i′s tax rate on the world interest rate is:
(1 + ∂R∂ti )
f ′′(ki) + (n− 1) + (n− 1)
∂R
∂ti
f ′′(k j)
= 0 (14)
1 +
∂R
∂ti
+ (n− 1)
∂R
∂ti
f ′′(k j)
= 0 (15)
∂R
∂ti
=
−1
n
(16)
A tax increase in country i will lower the world interest rate through reducing the
domestic demand for capital. Given that all countries have an equal impact on the
world interest rate, the effect of a tax increase in one country is decreasing in the num-
ber of countries. To see the effect of the tax increase on country i′s own tax base I
substitute this expression back into the arbitrage condition:
∂ki
∂ti
=
(1− 1n)
f ′′(ki)
(17)
In the benchmark case of autarki (n = 1) I see that the capital base is not affected
by an increase in the source tax rate. The effect with mobile capital is increasing in
the number of countries and it is the "mirror effect" of the interest rate which reacts
less with many countries. In order to find the optimal capital tax rate in this economy
I assume that the government maximizes a utility function of a representative indi-
vidual u(ci, gi). The two goods consumed are private consumption good ci and public
provided good gi. The goods represent different use of the same output and the mar-
ginal rate of transformation between ci and gi is 1. The government budget constraint
in each country is given by the tax on capital.
gi = tiki ∀i (18)
The representative individual resident in each country receives value of production
less the payments for mobile factor capital plus the net return R on capital endowment:
ci = f (ki)− f ′(ki)ki + Rk¯ (19)
Each government sets their rate of taxation taking the other countries (equilibrium)
tax rate as given. Inserting for the government and individual budget constraint, and
imposing symmetry ki = k¯ in the Nash equilibrium, gives the following expression for
the symmetric equilibrium in capital tax rates:
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∂u
∂ti
=
∂u
∂ci
∂ci
∂ti
+
∂u
∂gi
∂gi
∂ti
= 0 (20)
∂u
∂ti
= − ∂u
∂ci
k¯ +
∂u
∂gi
(k¯ + ti
(1− 1n)
f ′′(k¯)
) = 0 (21)
∂u
∂ti
= −k¯ +
∂u
∂gi
∂u
∂ci
(k¯ + ti
(1− 1n)
f ′′(k¯)
) = 0 (22)
∂u
∂ti
= k¯(m(ci, gi)− 1) + m(ci, gi)
(1− 1n)
f ′′(k¯)
= 0 (23)
In the case of autarky, it is derived that the effect of a tax increase on the govern-
ment welfare function gives us an efficient allocation with marginal rate of substitution
m(ci, gi) = (∂u/(∂gi))/(∂u/(∂ci)) = 1 and equal to the marginal rate of transforma-
tion. For an open economy with n > 1 the second expression in the optimality condi-
tion is negative and increasing in n. This implies that the marginal rate of substitution
m(ci, gi) > 1 must hold in the Nash equilibrium. The fundamental result is that the
uncoordinated Nash equilibrium leads to an under provision of the public good. This
effect is increasing with the amount of countries, n, for the equality to hold this im-
plies an increase in the marginal rate of substitution and decreased taxation. The effect
can be illustrated in a figure where the production possibility curve has slope −1. The
autarky equilibrium provided public good is g0. While in an open economy each gov-
ernment perceive the price of the public good to be −b and therefore supplies the g1
amount in an uncoordinated Nash equilibrium due to tax competition.
The decentralized Nash equilibrium under uncoordinated tax competition that the
countries reach is inefficient. Since the amount of capital is given the total base from
a collective viewpoint is inelastic and tax coordination would make the first best al-
location feasible (Keen and Konrad, 2012). There are however authors who argue the
potential benefits of tax competition (Wilson and Wildasin, 2004).
2.7 Country size
Hindriks and Myles (2006) has shown that the relative size of a country affects the
cost of taxation. A large country will have a less elastic tax base than a small country.
This is a situation where the competitive Nash equilibrium will lead to the smaller
country setting a lower tax rate and achieving a higher capital labor ratio than the
larger country.
The model above can show this in an example of two countries differing only in the
number of residents. If I suppose country 1 is "large" with a share s > 12 of the total
population and country 2 being "small" with a share 1 − s < 12 . The capital market
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Figure 3: Tax competition Nash equilibrium
clearing condition would be:
sk1(t1, t2) + [1− s]k2(t1, t2) = k¯ (24)
The arbitrage condition implies equality of after tax-return on capital across the two
countries.
f ′(k1)− t1 = R = f ′(k2)− t2
= f ′( k¯
1− s −
sk1
1− s )− t2
(25)
Differentiating this arbitrage condition gives the capital outflow in response to a
domestic tax increase for the large country:
dk1
dt1
=
1− s
[1− s] f ′′(k1) + s f ′′(k2) < 0 (26)
Analogously, for the small country I get:
dk2
dt2
=
s
[1− s] f ′′(k1) + s f ′′(k2) < 0 (27)
From equations (26) and (27) I see that both have a negative impact on capital from
an increase in their own tax rate. I also note that the outflow is less severe in the large
country when t1 = t2 I have k1 = k2, f ′′(k1) = f ′′(k2) and thus dk1dt1 <
dk2
dt2
< 0 for
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s > 1 − s. The larger country has a less elastic tax base and will therefore chose a
higher tax rate then the smaller country.
Hindriks and Myles (2006) shows that if the small country is sufficiently small it is
possible that the country will be better off with tax competition than without, at the
behest of the large country.
2.8 Neighbouring countries
From the fundamental tax model it can be seen that the perfect flow of capital equal-
izes marginal return of capital in all countries. However the foreign investment flows
seem to be concentrated to and from countries of geographical or cultural closeness,
see Table 1. Such an effect could stem from home bias as a result of information asym-
metries or some other reason leading to a relative over-investment in capital close to
home. In Norway the largest share of foreign owned firms originate from Sweden and
Denmark with Great Britain, USA and Germany following.
Table 1: Share of total number of foreign owned corporations
Norway Sweden Denmark
Norway - 15 % 9,2 %
Sweden 29 % - 25,6 %
Denmark 12,9 % 9,7 % -
Great Britain 10,4 % 8,9 % 8,2 %
USA 8,5 % 9,7 % 13,2 %
Germany 5,3 % 7,8 % 11,3 %
Sources: SSB (2015), Tilväxtanalys (2014), DST (2015)
Research has shown that these countries are among those with the least home bias
(Bekaert and Wang, 2009) the close ties and similarities between the Scandinavian
countries makes it a natural assumption that capital is more mobile between Norway
and neighbouring countries as Sweden then say Norway and Spain.
2.9 Other factors
Other factors that could influence the corporate tax base is the degree of public owner-
ship and organizational form of public enterprises. The liberalizations reforms of the
1980’s and 90’s increased privatization and incorporation of public enterprises moving
employees and companies from the government to corporations. From 1985 until 2002
60-70 governmental organizations have changed organizational form where most have
had various forms of incorporation (Christensen, 2004).
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Figure 4 shows the growth in number of corporations overall in the Norwegian
economy has been substantial just from the period of 2003 to 2013 the increase has
been more then a 60% growth in corporations from 140,000 to almost 240,000. If the
private corporate sector grows relatively stronger then the public or non-corporate
sector the tax base will grow relative to the economy as a whole. Even with falling
tax rates, a sufficient growth in the corporate sector in itself could keeping or increase
the economy share of tax revenues.
Figure 4: Number of corporations in Norway: 2003 - 2013
Source: SSB (2015)
It is also reasonable to argue that public ownership could alter the goals or be-
haviour of publicly owned firms. In the case where a company is fully or partially
owned by the state the company would go against shareholder interests if exerting ag-
gressive tax planning or profit shifting as the corporate income tax payed is also state
revenue. Such a company would likely have less incentives to exert effort in order to
reduce taxes. However the fully owned company Statkraft and majority owned Statoil
has been uncovered to shift profits through internal debt in low tax country Belgium
(Aftenposten, 2014). This could perhaps be explained by the standard managerial in-
centives of profit maximising rather then maximising profits, and taxes.
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3 Empirical analysis
The theoretical models provide some testable hypothesises about what factors affect
the corporate income tax base. This section will specify an econometric model and
the data used in order to test the effects of the corporate tax rate on the corporate tax
base in a panel of OECD countries. I will investigate which effects are present, and
how the corporate tax base is affected by the tax rate at home, as well as the tax rate in
tax competing countries. To approach this question, I will use spatial data and other
weights to establish tax competing countries along with a dynamic specification to
estimate the long run effects.
3.1 Empirical background
The empirical approach chosen is within a subset of a wealth of empirical research,
related to tax competition, growth and investment effects of corporate taxes. For an
overview of the literature and findings see Zodrow (2010) and Genschel and Schwarz
(2011).
Buettner (2003) does an in country study of a dynamic panel of over 1000 German
jurisdictions over 21 years and finds a strong negative impact of local tax rates on the
tax base. The neighbouring negative tax rate externality was only present for jurisdic-
tions of a relatively small size. The large, and significant, results of Büettner implies
that some municipalities are on the downward sloping part of the Laffer curve with a
long run elasticity of -1.40. The author explains this finding with the effect of the un-
derlying fiscal system of redistributive intergovernmental transfers of Germany and
that the estimation of the tax base using the highest statutory tax rate in a progressive
tax allowance system will provide an overestimation of the tax base.
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) use a method similar to Büettner for study of a panel
of 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005. The authors use different measures of the tax
rate with both effective, marginal and statutory tax rates to investigate the effects on
the corporate tax base. They find that a country’s aggregate reported corporate profits
are significantly and, negatively affected by the CIT rate reductions in neighbouring
countries. Further the authors find that a unilaterally reduction in domestic CIT rate
results in a lower domestic CIT revenue. They conclude that that the tax base is in-
elastic with regards to the domestic tax rate, and that the long run elasticity of the tax
base with regards to the domestic tax rate is -0.86. Meaning a one percent increase in
domestic tax rate is associated with a -0.86% decrease in the domestic tax base. Further
they find that one percent unilateral increase in the three closest neighboring countries
tax rate is associated with a 1.13% increase in the tax base. Providing that the effect of
only one country increasing the tax rate being third of 1.13% namely 0.38%.
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The empirical findings of this literature suggest that if a country lowers it’s tax rate
this there is a negative externality is present with regards to neighbouring countries
tax bases. As the world is arguably becoming increasingly globalised and data increas-
ingly available these results might change. With this paper I wish to further explore
these questions and test weather the results will change with adding data covering the
most recent years as well as updating the previous collected data. I will build upon the
existing literature and expand with new variables and adjustments to the data pertin-
ent to the study of the Norwegian context.
3.2 Regression specification
In order to estimate the elasticity of the corporate tax base, I will use the method of
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) to do a cross country study with the use panel data of a
subset of OECD countries. The method relies on publicly available aggregate country
level data. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the corporate income tax base
per capita in country i estimating the following equation:
lnbit = λ0 + ρlnbit−1 + λ1lnτit + λ2lnτ it + λxχit + Zµ + Zν + Zθ +εit (28)
Subscripts i, j denote country dimension i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N, while t denotes time
dimension t = 1, 2, . . . , T,. The two explanatory variables of interest are the corporate
income tax (CIT) in country i, τi j and the weighted average of CIT in neighboring
countries τ i j. Given the log specification the regression coefficients can be interpreted
as elasticities.
The regression controls for various macro data variables (χit) such as income per
capita, real unit labor cost, growth, income, export and EU membership. Further the
regression includes country specific effects (Zµ), time invariant effects (Zν) and indi-
vidual country trends (Zθ) and the autoregressive variable ρlnbit−1 of a one year lag of
the dependent variable.
The data for the corporate tax base is not available therefore it has to be estimated
from the corporate tax revenue. The variable bit is an estimation of the corporate in-
come tax base per capita6. The calculation is done by taking the CIT-revenue as percent
of GDP and multiplying this with GDP per capita. This gives CIT-revenue per capita
and dividing this by the statutory corporate income tax derives the estimate of the
corporate income tax base.
bit =
CITRevit
τit
(29)
The corporate tax revenues for the time period are recorded on both an accrual and
6The data available only provide taxes as percent of GDP and not directly in USD.
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cash basis. For the years recorded on cash basis the tax liabilities will normally be paid
with a one year delay. Therefore the tax base specification for years of cash flow will be
bit =
CITrevit+1
τit
while for the years recorded on an accrual basis the specification will be
within year bit =
CITrevit
τit
. This generates missing values on the dependent variable for
the year before transition from cash based to accrual based accounting. Out of the total
of 20 countries the dataset has 16 observations missing due to this change of recording
system7. While using the first lag of the dependent variable as a regressor also means
losing the lagged observations the first year.
In choosing a dynamic specification this will account for the persistence of the tax
base. The firm is expected to be a rational and forward looking actor, meaning be-
havioural changes to tax policy are expected to be partially immediate and parts of
the change will happen over time. The total accumulated effect is the most interesting
when evaluating fiscal and welfare effects of tax change. The autoregressive parameter
of the endogenous variable ρ captures the speed of the tax base adjustment. In order to
get the long run coefficient of the tax rate τit, I apply the following calculation λ˜1 =
λ1
1−ρ
equivalently for the coefficient on the neighbouring tax rates τit, λ˜2 =
λ2
1−ρ
8. Using a
dynamic model allows to account for more complicated timing of taxes such as losses
carried forward, refunds and advance payments affecting the development of the tax
revenue (Riedl and Rocha-Akis, 2012). Controlling for country specific time invari-
ant and time fixed effects allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity within the
sample. Including time specific effects will control for common time specific business
cycle shocks such as widespread financial crisis. Country specific effects will allow to
control for the wide variation in countries and unobserved effects such as differences
in efficiency of tax collection or tax evasion9. In addition the regression includes indi-
vidual country trends in order to control for long term growth in the tax base, where
countries can vary in the rate of growth in the corporate sector, and other country spe-
cific developments.
3.3 Sample data selection
The countries analyzed are a subset of the OECD countries for which reliable and con-
sistent annual data on tax revenue and tax rates for the period of 1982 to 2012 is avail-
able. The 20 countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland,
Germany10, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Japan, Italy,
7Years of change from cash to accrual recording of tax income: Australia 1997, Austria 1994, Canada
1998, Germany 2001, Spain 1999, Finland 1997, France 1991, UK 1989, Greece 1997, Ireland 1997, Italy
1999, Japan 1989, Netherlands 1998, Norway 1999, New Zealand 1988, Sweden 1999 and USA 1989.
8Assuming that the short run coefficient ρ is < 1.
9Such heterogeniety as the differences between tax collection in Greece and Germany for instance.
10Data for Germany up until 1990 refers to West Germany.
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Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand11, Sweden and USA12. Within a balanced
panel there is a trade off between the number of years and number of countries avail-
able. Data for Eastern Europe countries are available from 1995 on, data for Korea and
Iceland are available from 1983, while data for Portugal and Luxembourg are avail-
able from respectively 1991 and 1992. The year 2013 is excluded because corporate tax
revenues for three countries are not available at that time 13.
The corporate tax rate measure used is the total statutory corporate tax rate includ-
ing local and federal taxes, surcharges and deductability of local taxes14. I could not
utilize the effective and marginal corporate tax rates as there are no consistent meas-
ures calculated for the countries and period in question15. However the measure of
EATR and the statutory rate is highly correlated as the EATR is a weighted composi-
tion of the EMTR and the statutory rate. In choosing this specification the coefficients
λ1 and λ2 does not reflect a country’s change in tax legislation such as changes in de-
preciation rates and debt allowances. The correlation table shows a high correlation
between the statutory tax rate and the EATR, a correlation coefficient of 0.96 in Table
11 in the appendix, and Figure 9 shows and confirms that the variation in EATR is
highly correlated with changes in the statutory rate.Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) finds
that using the statutory rate does not significantly alter their results.
An overview of the data variables, measures and sources can be seen in Table 6 in
the appendix. I have also compiled an alternate set of data for Norway corrected for
petroleum sector revenues16. The data sources and calculations are shown in Table 7
in the appendix.
3.4 Neighbouring tax rate
In order to asses the impact of tax competition and the impact of competing countries
tax setting some measure of the competing tax rate is needed. The baseline weight-
ing scheme of the neighbouring tax rate variable τ¯it is given by a spatial component
and takes the weighted average of the three closest countries. It is provided by the
following equation:
τ it =
t
∑
j
ω
geo
i j τ jt (30)
11Data on real unit labor costs are not available before 1986.
12See appendix for list of country abbreviations.
13Netherlands, Greece and Australia.
14For Switzerland it is the federal tax that is deductable in the local tax.
15There are two databases each covering different years for different countries of the EATR and EMTR.
I attempted to combine these but the calculations were done using different assumptions and quality of
information available on the tax system lead to that I was unable to find a consistent measure.
16Abbreviated as NOR2
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ω
geo
i j =
 13 if j is among i’s three closest neighbours and j 6= i0 if not (31)
The spatial data used to calculate this weight is the smallest distance from capital to
capital between the countries. As indicated by the discussion in Section (2.8) distance is
a relevant factor to consider and a natural assumption to have a negative effect on the
mobility of capital. Invoking Tobler (1970) and his formulation of the first law of geo-
graphy; "Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than
distant things". The advantage of this method compared to looking at direct neigh-
bours is that it includes weights for island states such as the UK and Japan. Selecting
only a limited number of countries, as opposed to some weight including all countries,
will increase the variability of the estimator that could have a positive impact on stand-
ard errors (Riedl and Rocha-Akis, 2012). The disadvantage to this simplification is the
underlying assumption that any and all of the three closest countries each have an
equal effect on the tax base while disregarding actual investment flows, growth rates,
institutional and cultural factors. This weighting regime gives that the three closest
neighbours to the USA is Canada, UK and Ireland. For Norway it is Sweden, Denmark
and Finland. While for Australia this is New Zealand, Japan and Greece. That Greece
is the most likely country to compete for Australian tax base then the marginally more
distant (700km) USA is an effect worth noting of this rule. As an extension and part of
the robustness alternate weighting regimes including size of trading partners consid-
ering outward foreign direct investment flows (FDI) and growth rates will be explored
further.
3.5 Control variables
As shown in Section 2 there are many components influencing the corporate tax base.
Factors that determine a firms surplus is likely to be negatively influenced by the cost
of input factors, as well as positively determined by the amount of sales in the eco-
nomy. To control for these factors I use GDP per capita, denoted by income, and a
measure of the real unit cost of labor denoted by rulc. The real unit cost of labor in-
cludes the total costs of labor including social contribution, income taxes, allowances,
overtime and bonuses. The real unit cost of labor measure represents a direct link
between the productivity, relative to the cost of labor used, in generating the output.
Business cycles are also expected to affect the firms profits and therefore the tax base
providing grounds for including growth as a variable measuring the annual change in
GDP over the previous year. To control for an increased turnover as purely increases
in prices inflation is tried as another control variable.
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Fryges and Wagner (2010) uses a high quality panel of German firms to show
a positive statistically significant causal relationship of exporters compared to non-
exporters. Although the authors say the effect is small exports, as share of GDP, will
be included to capture this effect. Finally inclusion in the single European market is
argued to lower barriers of trade and therefore might positively affects firms profits
within these countries. Therefore I have added dummy variables for years of EU-
membership, including the year before accession to account for the effect of forward
looking firms, denoted eu f . As an extension to the model by Riedl and Rocha-Akis
(2012) I also experiment with adding an additional dummy EU including EFTA. As
a further extension of the analysis I experiment with including a dummy variable for
the years of having an explicit thin capitalization rules. Thin capitalization rules regu-
late the amount of debt a firm can get deductions for to reduce profit shifting through
internal loans between firms in different countries. Using data on thin capitalization
rules of 54 countries, Blouin et al. (2014) finds that the rules affect firm capitalization
structure, and leverage. OECD (2013) places such interest deduction rules as action
point 4 out of 15 in their plan to limit Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). To cap-
ture this effect I include thin capitalization (tcr) as a dummy variable which is expected
to positively influence the tax base in the countries introducing this rule. I also exper-
imented with including the difference between the CIT and the personal income tax
(PIT) to capture the effects of income shifting between organizational form.
3.6 Estimation technique, instrumentation and standard errors
The theoretical model described in equation (28) shows that issues regarding poten-
tial endogeneity, serial and spatial correlation will be addressed in this section. With
the use of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable partial adjustment
mechanism can be modeled. The autoregressive bit−1 is potentially endogenous if there
are first order serial correlation in the error terms, then εt−1 is correlated with εt and
the lagged regressor is by effect correlated with the error term (Murray, 2006). Rood-
man (2006) points to the use of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators
in dynamic panel data regressions where there is a large number of entities (N) and
a small number of periods (T), while if the T is large the panel data bias is negligible.
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) considers this and performs a Monte Carlo simulation
finding that the bias of their estimates using Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV)
are extremely small. I will, with the increase of periods in my dataset assume that the
LSDV estimator is still a suitable choice.
A further complication is that since the two regressors of main interest τit and τit are
determined simultaneously the variables are expected to be correlated with the error
term. In order to deal with this possible endogeneity the use of instrumental variables
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is considered. Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) compare results both including and exclud-
ing instrumenting for both the statutory as well as the EATR. The authors conclude
that their preferred regression using the statutory tax rate includes instrumentation
while with the EATR measure of the tax rate their preferred method is without instru-
mentation. However these results may change with a larger set of countries and more
observations therefore I will extend the analysis with the same basis of comparing with
and without instrumentation.
The instruments Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) choose are motivated by theoretical
and empirical studies in the literature concerning the determinants of CIT rates. The
instruments validity is considered by the use of J-statistic, F-test and the Durbin-Wu-
Hausmann test. The authors refer to Swank (1998) who finds that openness to trade
leads to a downward pressure in tax rates this is also confirmed by Slemrod (2004).
The assumptions is that policymakers have an increased incentive to improve compet-
itiveness and terms of trade of firms the more open the economy is. Following this
argument the share of imports and exports in the economy as share of GDP as an po-
tential instrument to the tax rates, denoted as openness which is also interacted with
the year variable to capture change of trend over the period. Another possible instru-
ment is weather the country has the status of being an offshore financial centre, often
described as tax havens, as defined by IMF (2000). This dummy variable is interacted
with the country’s population 17
The next instrument to consider is the personal income tax. Slemrod (2004) look at
the determinants of the CIT rate and finds that there is evidence of a strong association
between the top personal tax rate and the top statutory tax rate. As discussed in Section
2.4 the corporate income tax can work as a backstop from the PIT in order to avoid
distortions in organiasational form, also known as income shifting. Slemrod (2004)
shows that all else equal the CIT is higher in countries with a high top PIT making the
PIT-rate a potential instrument. Further the question of the relative sizes of a country
and how it affects their tax setting is addressed.
As shown in the theoretical discussion with the model of Hindriks and Myles (2006)
in Section 2.8 a larger country will want to set a higher tax rate then a comparatively
small country making population a potential instrument for the tax rate. However
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) also points out that in the case of economies of scale a
large country might attract more multinational corporations despite higher tax rates,
whereas if this is the case the instrument’s exogeniety is questionable. In addition the
authors include unemployment under the assumption that policymakers might want
to alleviate the tax burden of firms in times of high unemployment, but also points out
that this might be correlated with the business cycle.
The two requirements of an instrument is that it is both relevant and exogenous
17Countries in the sample identified as OFC’s are USA, Japan, UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
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(Stock and Watson, 2012). They are relevant if they are determinants of the endogenous
regressors namely the domestic and neighbouring tax rates. In order to mitigate issues
of reverse causality, namely that the instruments themselves might be endogenous,
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) applies the instruments in both their spatial and domest-
ically first lagged form. This is however not a straight forward assumption. Angrist
and Krueger (2001) warns about using lagged endogenous variables as instruments in
the presence of serial correlations in omitted variables or the error term.
Lastly using spatially lagged variables could introduce cross-sectional dependent
errors where the disturbances are likely to follow a spatial pattern stemming from sim-
ilar geographical conditions in adjacent countries (Riedl and Rocha-Akis, 2012). The
authors approaches this issue of contemporaneous correlation of arbitrary form with
the use of bootstrapping. Anselin (1990) describes the use of bootstrapping to obtain
robust standard errors in spatial econometrics. The method relies on re sampling ob-
servations the data set with a number of random draws with replacement. Drawing
from the underlying observations with equal probability (1/N where N is number of
observations) mean that some observations can be included more then once, or not at
all in the pseudo data set. I follow Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) with performing 200
replications in both the short- and long run estimates.
3.7 Data description
In visual plotted inspections of the data it is apparent that the statutory tax rates have
declined in almost all countries in the period. The exception is Ireland which has only
increased the tax rate. The rate of decline seem to have slowed in the recent years. Tra-
cing the development of the corporate income tax base, see Figure 8 in the appendix, it
can be seen that most countries reaches a top in 2007 before the financial crisis. Inspect-
ing the base per country it is apparent that Norway is an outlier with around four times
the tax base per capita as most countries starting mid 1990’s. When controlling Nor-
way for the petroleum sector I note that revenues align more with the trend. Ireland is
also an outlier with the second highest tax base per capita in the top year.
To see how this might influence the regression I did a scatter plot of the domestic
tax rate and the tax base in Figure 5. Ireland is an obvious outlier with the potential
of making the regression unstable as it is the only country which has consistently held
a low tax rate and only increased it in the period. Removing Ireland from the plot
as shown in the difference from a to b in Figure 5. Further comparing the dataset
with Norway corrected for petroleum sector in b to c shows that doing this correction
further aligns the data. I will come back to Norway as an extension but for the baseline
estimations follow Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) in excluding Ireland from the sample
but including it in calculating the neighbouring tax rates.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot, tax base and domestic tax rate.
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4 Estimation
In the process of exploring this topic I wanted to compare my methods and results
with that of Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012), in order to check that I am able to replicate
the results using the same methodology on the same time period, specifically 1982 to
2005, before extending the analysis. Upon request I received the data and do-file of
the authors. In order to ensure consistency and use of the most recent, and assumably,
most correct data I retrieved my own data from the sources as described in Table 6 in
the appendix. However as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 below running the regression
provided some different results. The long run coefficients on the variables of interest
τ and τ¯ are of a considerably higher value and the significance of the neighbouring
country variable has decreased as well as an increased standard error. For the sake of
robustness this warrants closer inspection.
The different results could stem from one or more of the following; i) difference in
estimation techniques, ii) change or difference in data sources, iii) error(s) in compiled
data sets, iv) measurement errors or v) undocumented transformation of variables by
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012). I will address these in turn.
4.1 Comparing results to Riedl and Rocha-Akis
Using the dataset provided by Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) I have successfully replic-
ated their results using my own adapted do-file indicating that the applied estimation
technique is the same but that the observations in the panels are different. In order to
assess the data I have merged the data sets performing both visual inspections as well
as comparing total and by country summary statistics. I have done this to check where
there are deviations and to check if these are originating from change of sources or er-
rors. I also generated variables taking the difference between individual observations
in both panels. The results show that there are overall variations in almost all of the
variables, and more in some countries. Data variation is not entirely unexpected as
the methodology and definition of macro data indicators are subject to change and ad-
justments (OECD, 2014). However if changes are coming purely from adjustments to
indexes or a unilateral transformations of unit of measurement, such that the provided
values are different but without real changes the main results should hold. In the case
of real unit cost of labor where the index value in the dataset used by Riedl and Rocha-
Akis (2012) is 100 in 2005, while in my dataset the index is 100 in 2010. If only this
is the case, significantly change of results raises concerns for the internal validity and
robustness of the methodology applied.
By the nature of the model differences to GDP and the statutory tax rate variable
are of importance as it is used estimation of both the dependent variable, as well as the
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neighbouring and domestic tax rate variable. A visual inspection of differences in ob-
servations of the tax base and domestic tax rate country, see Figure 7 in the appendix
for a percentage change comparison between panels, shows that there are a several
variations in the dependent variable tax base per capita (bit) as well as in the statutory
tax rate (τit). The largest variations seem to stem from different observations in stat-
utory tax rate which directly impacts the tax base estimate. Switzerland has a much
steeper increase in the corporate tax base in my estimations due to an increasingly de-
clining corporate tax rate, the same is the case in a lesser extent for Canada, Spain,
Greece and Sweden. In the US the tax base has a positive deviation between the data
sets, without this being driven by changes in the tax rate measure. Given the depend-
encies between the two variables potential measurement errors in the tax rate would
provide an incorrect measure of the tax base potentially over- or underestimating the
endogenous variable.
The database I have used to retrieve the tax rates is annually maintained by the Ox-
ford University Centre for Business Taxation which builds upon the tax rates used by
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) from the Institute for Fiscal Studies 18. Finland is excluded
from the overview as it is an outlier as a consequence of a different recording of when
Finland switched from cash to accrual based accounting where Riedl and Rocha-Akis
(2012) has recorded this to be 1997. According to the OECD revenue statistics 19 this
happened in 1987 resulting in different years of missing data and a lagged difference
between the recorded years.
Some other differences discovered between the data sets are that Riedl and Rocha-
Akis (2012) have not included Germany, France, Belgium and Spain in their EU- mem-
bership dummy. Further for five countries I have not been able to recreate the neigh-
bouring tax rate based upon the weighting scheme and the statutory tax rates in their
data set20. The result of this process is that I can confirm that my methodology is con-
sistent and correct with the methodology as described by Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012)
and that change of results stem from differences in the generated data sets and sources.
Through this process I have also been able to double check deviations and differences
making me confident that my panel is correctly assembled. For a summary statistics
on the difference between variables see Table 9 and Table 8 in the appendix.
From Table 2 compares two regressions. Column (1) is the regression run on own
data and (2) regression run on the data used and provided by Riedl and Rocha-Akis
(2012). The results of (1) show that the tax base in the long run estimate is elastic with
18www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Data/tax-data-
description-13-14.doc
19http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=tax-data-en&doi=data-00235-en
20I double checked which countries were used as the three closest neighbouring weights to create the
weighted tax rate τit. Using a solver trying the combination of any three tax rates for that year came up
with no matching combination for USA, Norway, Australia, Germany and Ireland.
26
Table 2: Regression comparison mine and Riedl and Rocha-Akis’ (2011) data
(1) (2)
VARIABLES CIT-base (mine) CIT-base (RR)
ln τ -1.328*** -0.805**
(0.381) (0.382)
ln τ 1.046 0.752**
(0.882) (0.349)
ln income 1.636*** 1.154***
(0.558) (0.304)
ln rulc -3.738*** -4.387***
(1.069) (1.005)
growth -0.00256 0.0138*
(0.0181) (0.00877)
ln export 0.943*** 0.723***
(0.379) (0.247)
euf 0.529* 0.257**
(0.370) (0.144)
Constant 12.04** 8.174***
(6.497) (2.091)
Observations 361 361
Country-FE, χ216 174.4*** 262.9***
Time-FE, χ221 39.70*** 47.56***
Time-trend, χ217 95.27*** 164.5***
Wald-F 31.71 29.86
Hansen J, χ28 11.65 2.768
Hansen p-value 0.167 0.948
Endogeneity test χ22 0.971 5.207
Endogeneity, p-value 0.615 0.0740*
Notes: Both regressions show long run elasticities for the years 1982 - 2005. I use Riedl
and Rocha-Akis’ (RR) preferred regression specification with the statutory tax rate as
the tax rate variable regressor. Standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed significance
levels: * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%)
regards to both domestic and neighbouring countries tax rate with a long run elasticity
of -1.328 significant at the 1% level. Comparing to (2) the effect is significantly greater
where Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) finds the elasticity with regards to domestic tax
rate being inelastic at a long run coefficient of -0.805 significant at the 5% level. The
increased elasticity can also be viewed with regards to the neighbouring country tax
rate, however in my own results the neighbouring country tax rate is not significant.
The Hansen-J test over-identifying restrictions test the joint null hypothesis that
the instruments are valid and uncorrelated with the error term (see related first stage
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regression Table 3). The test cannot reject the null indicating that the instruments might
be valid. However it is worth noting that it is of a much lower p-value (0.168) then in
the compared dataset (0.948).
The endogeneity tests21 the null hypthesis is that the regressors τ and τ may be
considered exogenous. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in my own dataset (p-
value of 0.615), while RR dataset can reject the null a confidence of 10% (p-value of
0.0740). This indicates that the instruments are correlated with the error term and, if so,
invalid. Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) concludes in their regression that the LSDV-IV is
the preferred specification using the statutory rate because of these findings. However
my own data is not as clear in this regard. To closer examine this question turns us to
the first stage regression in Table 3. There are several instruments that seem to have a
weak explanation power of the regressors. Unemployment in my own dataset is not
statistically significant, population has a significance level lower on both domestic and
neighbouring countries tax rate. The personal income tax in neighbouring countries is
significant at the 5% level in the panel of Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) with regards to
both domestic and neighbouring tax rates while it is only significant at the 10% level
with regards to the domestic tax rate in my own panel.
One important note is that Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) mainly focused their in-
strumentation of the effective average tax rate and not the statutory. The choice of
instruments is done with the regards to the EATR where the significance level is in-
creased in some cases.
4.2 Full dataset regression
Extending the analysis and taking advantage of my full dataset I will in this section
derive my baseline estimates of the data spanning from 1982 to 2012 of all 19 coun-
tries. The results are shown in Table 4. Regressions (1) to (9) includes instrument-
ation (LSDV-IV) while regression (10) and (11) is done without instruments (LSDV),
regression (11) is the short run estimates. In regressions (1) to (8) i use the same in-
strumentation and vary the use of regressors. Adding inflation and a dummy for thin
capitalization rules (7) are insignificant and does not change the results. Replacing EU-
membership with EFTA membership in column (8) also makes the dummy variable
insignificant. Regression (9) removes the two lagged endogenous regressors as instru-
ments, see first stage regression in Table 6.4 in the appendix comparing the alternative
instruments between, the otherwise equal, regressions (5) and (9). The results is that
the F-test22 value falls to the point where it is well below the thumb rule of 10 implying
21A variant of the Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test called by the use of endogtest() option with ivreg2 in
Stata.
22Specifically the rk. Wald F-statistic as is the robust analog of the Cragg-Donald statistic (Baum et al.,
2007).
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Table 3: First stage of regressions in Table 2.
My datatset RR dataset
(1) (2) (1) (2)
ln τ ln τ ln τ ln τ
L1.ln τ 0.638*** 0.0165 0.702*** 0.00341
(0.100) (0.0350) (0.0841) (0.0351)
L1.ln τ 0.0320 0.644*** 0.0784 0.0624***
(0.0832) (0.0566) (0.0880) (0.0519)
L1.ln pit 0.111** -0.00274 0.111** -0.00672
(0.0642) (0.0239) (0.0494) (0.0248)
L1. ln pit 0.148* 0.0573 0.150** 0.0934**
(0.103) (0.0665) (0.0782) (0.0537)
L1. ln unemp -0.0172 -0.00364 -0.0224 -0.0222**
(0.0218) (0.0113) (0.0205) (0.0106)
L1. ln unemp -0.0895** -0.0769** -0.0535* -0.0844***
(0.0532) (0.0389) (0.0367) (0.0206)
pop 0.0217* -0.0199** 0.0128*** -0.0136***
(0.0138) (0.00691) (0.00454) (0.00433)
offshore*pop -0.00972 -0.0195* -0.00641 0.0108**
(0.0169) (0.0122) (0.00647) (0.00518)
openness -28.83 20.00 -5.628 2.579
(40.73) (17.87) (10.33) (6.155)
openness*year 0.0145 -0.0100* 0.00282 -0.00129
(0.0204) (0.00867) (0.00517) (0.00308)
Constant -3.605** 4.394*** -1.597** 0.364
(2.019) (1.410) (0.734) (0.406)
Exogenous regressors Included Included
R2 0.936 0.976 0.938 0.973
N 361 361 361 361
Standard errors in parentheses
One-tailed significance levels: * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%)
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(7)
a
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
ln
τ
-1.152***
-1.346***
-1.179***
-0.995***
-1.051***
-1.049***
-1.153***
-0.944*
-1.167***
-0.558***
(0.461)
(0.413)
(0.356)
(0.349)
(0.351)
(0.351)
(0.374)
(0.621)
(0.226)
(0.119)
ln
τ
1.024
0.945
0.907*
0.739
0.744
0.716
0.493
0.173
0.590*
0.282*
(0.939)
(0.767)
(0.634)
(0.623)
(0.617)
(0.621)
(0.534)
(0.841)
(0.396)
(0.189)
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efta
1.016**
0.876***
0.654**
0.584**
0.548**
0.539**
0.203
b
0.486*
0.504*
0.241*
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(0.356)
(0.339)
(0.332)
(0.322)
(0.323)
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(0.354)
(0.313)
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0.930***
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(0.345)
(0.346)
(0.380)
(0.339)
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(0.176)
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-4.083***
-2.853***
-2.613***
-2.535***
-2.812***
-2.575***
-2.566***
-1.223***
(0.766)
(0.748)
(0.736)
(0.746)
(0.741)
(0.726)
(0.727)
(0.325)
grow
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0.0510***
0.0462***
0.0455***
0.0489***
0.0479***
0.0454***
0.0216***
(0.0156)
(0.0159)
(0.0159)
(0.0161)
(0.0170)
(0.0152)
(0.006)
ln
export
0.484**
0.487**
0.562**
0.471**
0.500**
0.239**
(0.258)
(0.257)
(0.272)
(0.264)
(0.237)
(0.117)
L1.ln
tax
base
0.522***
(0.0639)
C
onstant
7.400***
-1.598
17.35***
12.08***
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8.694**
9.758**
8.775**
8.506**
4.064
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(4.598)
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(4.705)
(4.597)
(2.069)
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141.2***
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χ
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71.82***
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χ
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a weak instrument problem. The findings are, similar to the earlier regression compar-
ing the sub-sample. Including the lagged tax rate variables are significant at the one
percent level and adding it removes some of the significance of the other variables and
overall lifts the explanatory power of the variables quite a bit. However the Hansen
J over-identifying test is close to significant in most regressions indicating that the in-
struments themselves might be endogenous. Comparing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
endogeneity test I can see that the differences to the results running on regular LSDV is
not large. The test is not able to reject the joint null hypothesis that the tax rate variables
can be considered exogenous. The two tests are not proving to give any clear answers.
Comparing to the regression without instrumentation the results are not significantly
changed and as the LSDV estimator is more efficient I will follow Riedl and Rocha-Akis
(2012) and not rely on instrumentation as my preferred regression. Column (10) is the
preferred regression with an R2 of 0.973 implying the regression fits the data well.
Regression (11) show the short run estimates. The tax base coefficient ρ is provided
in the regressor "L1.ln tax base" and shows the rate of adjustment of the tax base where
half the adjustment happens already in the immediate year of change. Comparing
my short run results to those of Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) it shows that the rate
of adjustment is larger while the short run effect of the domestic tax rate is the same.
However the neighbouring tax rate follows the earlier results where the coefficient is
only significant at the 10 % level and has a quite low effect and only half of Riedl and
Rocha-Akis (2012) estimates.
Comparing my results to those of the sub-sample which was comparable to Riedl
and Rocha-Akis (2012) estimates the sample differ in the number of years and coun-
tries. The results indicate that including these additional countries, New Zealand and
Denmark, in addition to the 7 additional years provide an estimate of a slightly less
elastic tax base. My findings show lower estimates from the initial comparison of my
own subset regression with respects to the effect of the domestic tax rate, as well as a
a lower, but more significant, effect of the neighbouring tax rate. In order to find the
semi-elasticity of the corporate tax rate I can re-specify the preferred regression (10)
with using the tax rates without log transformation. The resulting semi-elasticity is
-2.93 with respect to the domestic tax rate and 1.57 with respect to a unilateral increase
in the tax rate, of one percentage point, of the three closest neighbours. In the case of a
change in a single neighbour country the effect would be a third of this, namely 0.52.
4.3 Robustness
In this section I will investigate the robustness of the baseline estimates reported in
Table 4. I will follow the same procedure and alternative specifications as Riedl and
Rocha-Akis (2012) with a few addition and changes that will be noted. First I will test
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the results with two alternate weighting regimes, weighting in foreign direct invest-
ments and a simplified weighting regime of Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) with regards
to similarities in growth rates. Further I will extend the analysis and look at the ef-
fects of adjusting Norway and exclude petroleum revenues. I will also look at a sub
sample of Northern European countries, alternative specification of the tax base, tax
rates, spillover effects and excluding dynamics and the influence of neighbours.
The baseline weighting scheme of the neighbouring tax rate variable τ it is given
purely by a spatial component taking the average tax rate of the three closest neigh-
bours. As noted in Section 3.4 this can provide some strange results. Considering
which countries compete for the common tax base, through utilizing the flow of for-
eign investments, could be a good indicator. This is done by constructing an additional
weight composed the previous geographical weight and with equal weight a similarly
constructed variable composed of the three countries receiving the largest amount of
outwards flowing FDI. This creates the weighting regimeωFDIGeo = 0.5ω
FDI
i j + 0.5ω
Geo
i j
The weighting for FDI is provided in the following way:
ωFDIi j =
 13 if j is among i’s three largest receivers of FDI0 if not (32)
One thing to notice is that a few recurring countries are the top trading partners of
most of the dataset. USA is among the top three in 17 of the 20 countries. In Figure 6
the number of times a country has position 1 and 3 of outgoing FDI in the dataset is
presented graphically.
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012) also apply bilateral growth weighting matrix by con-
sidering countries in the dataset with the most similar average growth rates in addition
to proximity. The authors created a weighting scheme based upon the relative close-
ness of average growth rates of all other countries’. Their result was both increased
significance and doubling of the impact of the neighbouring/competing countries tax
rate coefficient showing that the weighting regime has a big impact on the coefficient
of the neighbouring country tax rate. I experimented with constructing a simplified
variant of their weighting matrix consisting of the average of the three countries with
the most similar growth rates. Given equal weights I combined the geographical com-
ponent and the growth component 23. The results of this decreased the significance and
size of of the effect of the neighbouring tax rate and I chose to omit the results from the
table as the weighting regime proved inferior of the two previously described, and it is
not directly comparable or a sufficient alternative to the similar specification by Riedl
and Rocha-Akis (2012). In Table 5 the baseline weighting regimeωGeoi j is used in all but
Column (1).
23DenotedωGrowthGeo
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Table 5: Robustness analysis of preferred regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES ωFDIGeo NOR2 τ diff N.Europe Endog Spillover Static
ln τ -1.168*** -1.240*** -1.322*** -1.095*** -1.086*** 0.689***
(0.220) (0.204) (0.415) (0.194) (0.226) (0.126)
ln τ 0.774* 0.506* 1.246 0.376 0.801** 0.100
(0.471) (0.352) (1.094) (0.357) (0.414) (0.216)
τ − τ a -2.655***
(0.499)
ln income 1.240*** 1.070*** 1.204*** 1.316*** 0.991*** 1.139***
(0.304) (0.322) (0.323) (0.211) (0.266) (0.151)
ln rulc -2.566*** -1.518** -2.702*** -3.607*** -3.038*** -1.972***
(0.730) (0.713) (0.712) (1.263) (0.786) (0.515)
growth 0.0461*** 0.0549*** 0.0470*** 0.0239 0.0475*** 0.0282***
(0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0152) (0.0225) (0.0152) (0.00876)
ln export 0.491** 0.343* 0.436** 0.00568 0.386***
(0.237) (0.247) (0.241) (0.656) (0.145)
euf 0.488* 0.489* 0.584** 0.610 0.444** 0.525* 0.231*
(0.302) (0.306) (0.283) (0.652) (0.236) (0.325) (0.162)
L1.ln rulc -3.820***
(0.790)
L1.ln export 0.379**
(0.183)
growth 0.0283
(0.0233)
ln income -0.286
(0.335)
ln rulc -1.040
(1.484)
Constant 8.868** 4.745 9.960** 10.98** 21.24*** 19.86** 6.519***
(4.604) (4.310) (4.732) (5.708) (3.887) (10.82) (2.669)
Observations 535 535 535 311 564 535 551
Country-FE,χ218 226.86*** 196*** 209.7*** 73.23***
b 365.3*** 228*** 578.9***
Time-FE, χ227 46.00*** 54.58*** 39.47*** 37.92** 86.02*** 47.98*** 113.9***
Time-trend, χ219 107.88*** 89.87*** 111.4*** 55.64***
c 199.3*** 105.7*** 303.3***
R2 0.973 0.971 0.973 0.970 0.931 0.973 0.960
Standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed significance levels: * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%)
aInterpreted as the semi-eliasticity namely the percentage change in tax base from a one percentage
point increase in the difference between domestic and foreign tax rate.
bχ210
cχ210
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Figure 6: FDI number of top 1 and top 3 position by receiving countries
Source: United Nations Conferance on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2015)
As shown in Figures 1 and 5 Norway stands out with a very high corporate tax
revenue per capita as a result of a special petroleum tax24 of highly profitable natural
resources (Lund, 2014). Natural resources and the rents procured can be assumed to
be country specific and therefore not competed over internationally. Other countries,
such as Canada and the USA, also have revenues stemming from natural resources
as well with rich deposits of oil and gas, but not in the same proportions per capita.
The panel data regression corrects for country specific effects in order to mitigate bias
stemming from fixed country specific factors, however the estimates with the alternate
specification for Norway (2) indicates that excluding Norway’s petroleum sector has a
noticeable increase on the average elasticity of the tax base.
In the regression specification in column (3) the tax rate variable is redefined to
be the difference between domestic and foreign tax rate. The variable is interpreted
as a semi-elasticity. Different specification such as the differences between the logar-
ithm of the tax rates, or the ratio between them, provide similar results. Riedl and
Rocha-Akis (2012) comments that this specification seem to be driven primarily by the
domestic tax rate and that the results hold even with a foreign tax rate is constructed of
random weights. I applied the different weighting regimes previously described and
found that the coefficient on the difference increased, along with the significance, of
the neighbouring tax rate in the baseline regression. The variations in terms of semi-
24And up until 1992 use of royalty taxes.
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elasticities were quite large 25.
The sample data includes countries in four different continents. In order to see
if there might be variations within sub-samples where closeness of markets and cul-
tural differences are perhaps more similar I have taken a sub sample of Northern and
Western European countries26. The results shown in column (4) are largely unaltered.
The increase in the tax rate coefficients could indicate that these countries have a more
elastic tax bases and that tax competition is fiercer. However this could also be likely
due to excluding the two largest economies in the sample, Japan and USA, which are
expected to have a less elastic tax base then the smaller European countries. For this
sub-sample I also experimented with including a dummy variable for the years when
Norway, Finland and Sweden were under the dual income tax. The dummy was not
significant and including it did not alter the results.
One potential concern for endogeneity is that the firms profits might be endogen-
ous and correlated with the income per capita and real unit cost of labor regressors.
This is an increasing source of concern as income per capita is utilized to estimate the
tax base variable27 and therefore has a direct mechanical link in the model. In order
to see if the results hold while excluding the income measure from both sides of the
equation, I performed the following analysis. The endogenous variable in regression
given in column (5) is the natural logarithm of corporate tax base as percent of GDP.
The lagged variables of labor cost and exports are included as well as excluding the
directly related GDP measures of growth and income per capita and the main results
are consistent under this specification. In specification (6) the baseline model is exten-
ded to include the spatially lagged macro variables that determine a country’s tax base.
In the baseline model it is assumed that the neighbouring countries only effect the do-
mestic tax base through the tax rate externality. However there might be effects work-
ing through other parts of the economy. The spatially lagged variables are denoted
with overlines, namely growth, income and rulc. In this case, the effect of the domestic
tax rate is slightly lower while the neighbouring tax rate coefficient is increased in size
and significance level. This suggests that an economy’s tax base is influenced by these
macroeconomic determinants of the neighbouring countries in addition to the tax rate.
Further I tested including a variable for the difference between the CIT and the PIT, the
effect was not significant and did also not alter the results.
Lastly an alternative specification provided in column (7) excludes dynamics. It
shows that the impact of domestic taxes are significantly lower without the dynamic
25-2.87 with the use ofωFDIGeo to -1.95 with the use of the least significant weighting regimeω
Growth
Geo
26Specifically Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, United Kingdom, Belgium, Nether-
lands, France and Switzerland.
27The OECD database only provides corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, therefore the
estimation required a transformation through the income per capita variable to find the corporate tax
revenue in USD.
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effect regarding the persistence of the tax base. My coefficient is only slightly altered
when excluding neighbouring countries (-0.704 instead of -0.689) indicating that the
domestic tax and dynamic effects are the main contributors. Riedl and Rocha-Akis
(2012) compares the static specification and their own results of -0.4 to two single coun-
try estimates where the static elasticities are -0.5 for the German panel of Dwenger and
Steiner (2008) and -0.2 for the US data of Gruber and Rauh (2007).
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5 Conclusion
The effects of international tax competition is a field subjected to a plethora of research
and attention. The ongoing reform proposals in both Norway and Sweden make this
still a highly current topic. This paper has investigated the effects of the domestic and
neighbouring country tax rates on the tax base. Utilizing the methodology of Riedl
and Rocha-Akis (2012), I have explored the tax base sensitivity to the tax setting, while
controlling for international fiscal leakages. I have found that the tax base is elastic
with regards to changes in the domestic tax rate. Furthermore, with regards to fiscal
competition, the effects on the tax base of changes in neighbouring countries tax rate
is small. The estimated model does not distinguish between the different channels
through which the tax base moves. The changes in tax rate affects how much and
where the firm invests, the amount of profit it shifts as well as its legal and financial
structure. The estimated effect is a combination of these. Relocated investments and
shifted profits will have a considerably larger revenue and welfare consequence than
spillover effects between a country’s personal and corporate tax. The estimated semi-
elasticity of the tax base with regards to changes in the domestic tax rate is found to
be -2.9. This comes close to the total estimate of -3.1 provided in the meta-study by
De Mooij and Ederveen (2008). The large estimate of the tax base elasticity indicates
that there is a large excess cost of taxing corporate income. The finding of an elastic tax
base in the long run reveal that a one point reduction in the tax rate provides a more
then proportional increase in the tax base. About half of this effect is in the immediate
short run.
Being granted access to Riedl and Rocha-Akis’s (2012) dataset and do-file, I have
been able to directly compare my results, estimation technique and dataset to theirs.
The results of a detailed comparison showed that the differences were in the data ob-
servations and not methodology. For the equivalent period and countries in 1982 to
2005 I found an elasticity of -1.328 compared to -0.805 using the dataset of Riedl and
Rocha-Akis (2012), in addition to a larger and insignificant neighbouring tax rate. In-
troducing the most recent data and two more countries lowered the domestic tax rate
elasticity. This could be interpreted as a development in the sensitivity of the tax base
or as a result of a larger sample, and improvements in data quality of more recent years.
The estimated elasticity is also likely to be high as lowering of the statutory tax rate is
often done in combination with base-broadening measures, such as lowering depreci-
ation allowances (Devereux et al., 2002). Calculating a consistent measure of average
effective tax rates over this period would be an interesting next step in understanding
these effects.
The low impact and elasticity of the neighbouring tax rate does not convincingly
explain why countries would engage in fierce tax competition. However as firms are
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forward looking and governments are arguably more so. The governments are reacting
to the competing countries tax-setting making the domestic tax rate endogenous with
the neighbouring tax setting. Such a behavioural response in governments could mit-
igate the effect captured on tax rates in neighbouring countries. In the case of Norway
this is exemplified by the strong indication to follow suit on the Swedish tax setting in
both the previous and coming reform proposal.
One of the econometric challenges in this macro data model are the inter-dependencies
with estimating the tax base from the tax rate. Any measurement errors in the tax rate
variable would feed back into measurement error in the dependent tax base variable
and potentially provide noticeable bias. In replicating the results of Riedl and Rocha-
Akis (2012) over the same period potentially small changes, adjustments or variations
to the data sources seem to have provided relatively large impacts on the results. With
the use of detailed firm level data between countries, one could be able to distinguish
the different channels influencing the tax base and in particular profit shifting and
would be a very interesting way forward to see the effects of coming reform changes.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Data variables and sources
Table 6: Data variables, measures and sources
Variable Measure Source
STAT Total corporate tax rate. Sum of fed-
eral tax rate, local tax rate taking into
account surcharge and deductability
of local taxes
CBT Tax Database
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-
impact/tax/publications/data
CIT rev. Total CIT revenues as % of GDP OECD (2015) Revenue Stat-
istics (online database) ht-
tps://data.oecd.org/
CIT base Own calculation: CIT revenues %
multiplied with GDP per capita di-
vided by STAT.
income Gross domestic product in current
USD per capita
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Economic Outlook Database
(WEO), October 2014
rulc Real unit cost of labor. Ratio of com-
pensation per employee to nominal
GDP per person employed. 2010 =
100
European Commission AMECO
database.
export Own calculation: Export of goods
and services divided by GDP
AMECO database.
openness Own calculation: Exports plus im-
ports of goods and services as share
of GDP.
AMECO database
growth Percentage change in real GDP over
the previous year
WEO
unemp Unemployment in percentage of
total labor force.
WEO
pop Population of country in millions. WEO
inf Annual percentage change of aver-
age consumer prices.
WEO
PIT Top personal income tax rate, central
and representative sub-central rate.
OECD http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-
policy/tax-database.htm
EUF Dummy = 1 for years of EU mem-
bership including year before acces-
sion.
http://europa.eu/
offshore Dummy = 1 if country listed as an
Offshore Financial Centre (OFC).
IMF (2000)
distance Distances between capitals in kilo-
metres measured of latitudes and
longitudes
CEPII www.cepii.fr/distance/geo_cepii.dta
FDI Foreign direct investments outward
positions in USD by country, aver-
aged over the period 1982 - 2012.
UNCTAD (2015) Foreign Direct In-
vestment Database
tcr Countries introducing explicit thin
capitalization rules 1982-2004.
IMF working paper Blouin et al.
(2014)
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Table 7: Data variables, measures and sources (Norway corrected for petroleum sector)
Variable Measure Source
income Own calculation: Gross domestic
product excl. petroleum sector
as percentage of GDP multiplied
with WEO income data.
SSB and WEO
CIT base Own calculation 1981-1984 and
2013. CIT revenues excl. petro-
leum sector as percentage of GDP
excl. petroleum sector.
Ministry of Finance, SSB
and SSB Tax Statistics
1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984
www.ssb.no/a/histstat/nos/
export Own calculation: Export excl pet-
roleum sector as share of GDP
excl. petroleum sector.
SSB
openness Sum of imports and exports excl.
petroleum sector as share of GDP
excl. petroleum sector.
SSB
growth Own calculation: percentage
change in real GDP excl. pet-
roleum sector over previous
year.
SSB
Country abbreviations: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada
(CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland
(FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Greece (GRC), Japan (JPN), Italy (ITA),
Ireland (IRL), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Sweden (SWE)
and USA (USA). Norway corrected for petroleum revenues is abbreviated (NOR2).
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6.2 Tables comparing my own and Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012)’s
data
Table 8: Descriptive statistics. Differences between own and compared dataset.
mean sd min max count
D_CITbase -10.47871 265.9531 -1956.633 2570.231 414
D_STAT .0029114 .0307929 -.123407 .11 432
D_income 392.5895 501.322 -572.4761 2397.737 432
D_growth .0602106 .3267787 -1.892 1.607 432
D_export -.0183831 .0383624 -.2267378 .0930452 432
D_infl -.0088912 .2376278 -3.056 3.071 432
D_eu .2152778 .4114914 0 1 432
D_pit .0002255 .001876 -2.86e-08 .03 432
D_pop -.0009677 .0790753 -.394 .3779988 432
D_offshore 0 0 0 0 432
D_pop*offshore -.0011111 .0199365 -.1440125 .1409998 432
D_STAT -.0315803 .0473293 -.1816667 .1481467 432
N 432
Notes: The variables show difference (D_) in values VarMineit −VarRRit between mine
and Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2012)’s dataset for key variables.
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Table 9: Correlation table. Differences between own and compared dataset.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) D_CITbase 1.00
(2) D_STAT -0.48 1.00
(3) D_STAT 0.09 -0.26 1.00
(4) D_income 0.22 -0.11 0.09 1.00
(5) D_growth 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.09 1.00
(6) D_export 0.34 -0.22 -0.04 0.12 0.13 1.00
(7) D_infl 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01 1.00
(8) D_eu 0.09 -0.14 -0.25 0.23 0.11 0.15 -0.03 1.00
(9) D_PIT 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.03 1.00
(10) D_pop -0.02 0.04 -0.19 -0.22 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 1.00
(11) D_popoffshore 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.22 0.25
Notes: The variables show difference in values between my own and Riedl and
Rocha-Akis (2012)’s dataset for key variables. Dummy "offshore" omitted because of
no difference between sets.
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6.3 Visual and descriptive data of own dataset 1982–2012
Table 10: Summary statistics
mean sd min max count
STAT .3774544 .0908186 .211729 .627434 570
STAT .3582597 .078386 .2175 .59948 570
EATR .2984407 .0671593 .161032 .495927 377
EATR .2911936 .0624953 .182683 .495927 443
Tax base per capita 2987.115 4341.406 61.29987 40973.99 554
income 28462.68 15033.93 4379.138 99249 570
income 29776.34 13582.03 7322.645 71745.32 570
growth 2.2211 2.177394 -8.269 7.259 570
rulc 102.3999 5.401929 90.01939 124.034 567
export .3265352 .1577865 .0697541 .8223139 570
inf 3.198863 3.108286 -1.342 23.113 570
PIT .5042369 .1053152 .235 .93 570
PIT .5134805 .0706884 .4055667 .73 570
euf .5701754 .4954857 0 1 570
efta .7263158 .4462404 0 1 570
pop 43.35986 63.3329 3.184 314.154 570
unemp 7.282444 3.811774 .501 24.8 570
openness .6378002 .2908444 .1592399 1.640057 570
offshore .2631579 .4407342 0 1 570
offshore*pop 25.30975 66.14117 0 314.154 570
tcr .4947368 .5004114 0 1 570
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6.4 First stage regression for full sample 1982 - 2012
Table 12: First stage regression comparing instruments (5) and (9) in Table 4.
(5) (5) (9) (9)
ln τ ln τ ln τ ln τ
L1.ln τ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.0345∗
(0.0728) (0.0267)
L1.ln τ 0.0745 0.699∗∗∗
(0.0595) (0.0411)
L1ln pit 0.106∗∗ -0.00190 0.278∗∗∗ -0.00689
(0.0489) (0.0162) (0.0423) (0.0212)
L1ln pit 0.0705 0.0354 0.154∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0444) (0.0924) (0.0614)
L1.ln unemp -0.0265∗ -0.00229 -0.0590∗∗∗ -0.0161
(0.0189) (0.00886) (0.0215) (0.0128)
L1.ln unemp -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.0742∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0174) (0.0325) (0.0212)
pop 0.00604 -0.00531∗ 0.00101 -0.0146∗∗∗
(0.00613) (0.00340) (0.00840) (0.00507)
offshore*pop -0.00752 -0.00591 -0.00481 -0.0102
(0.0107) (0.00632) (0.0143) (0.00969)
openness 4.203 6.098 40.88∗∗ 34.53∗∗∗
(15.38) (6.805) (18.14) (12.51)
openness*year -0.00205 -0.00305 -0.0203∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗
(0.00765) (0.00339) (0.00904) (0.00624)
Constant -1.130 1.575∗∗ -0.546 3.115∗∗∗
(1.192) (0.740) (1.614) (1.219)
Exogenous regressors Included Included
N 535 535 535 535
adj. R2 0.933 0.973 0.886 0.938
Standard errors in parentheses
One-tailed significance levels: * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%)
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